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RECENT
DEVELOPMENT
Inflation and the Concept of Reorganization
Value
I. INTRODUCTION
The rehabilitation of a financially troubled corporation in a
bankruptcy reorganization proceeding1 frequently entails the dis-
tribution of new equity shares to creditors under a judicially ap-
proved plan. In such a case, the court determines the value to be
assigned to the shares distributed.' Using Supreme Court guide-
lines, the court first ascertains the present worth of the firm's fu-
ture earnings expectancy' and then apportions that value among
the new shares. This procedure follows from the accepted view that
"[t]he value of a corporation's stock is determined by expectations
regarding future earnings of the corporation and by the rate at
which those earnings are discounted."4 Consequently, both predic-
tion of the reorganized firm's future earnings and selection of a
discount rate must precede a judicial determination of the value of
1. Federal bankruptcy laws contemplate two alternative forms of relief for corporate
debtors: rehabilitation or liquidation. Until October 1, 1979, the governing statute was the
former Bankruptcy Act, Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (current version at 11
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (Supp. III 1979)). Thereafter, new cases were governed by Title I of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, referred to as the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1174 (Supp. II 1979). The corporate rehabilitation provisions of the Bankruptcy Act were
contained in Chapter X (Corporate Reorganizations) and Chapter XI (Arrangements).
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code embraces both forms of relief. The corporate reorgani-
zation cases discussed in this Recent Development were all commenced under Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act. This Recent Development does not focus on the differences between
the provisions of the two statutes. For a discussion of those differences, see Pachulski, The
Cram Down and Valuation under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L. REV. 925
(1980). This Recent Development concerns principles of enterprise valuation that remain
applicable to all corporate reorganization cases.
2. See Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1968); In re Equity Fund-
ing Corp. of America, 416 F. Supp. 132, 145 (C.D. Cal. 1975). See generally 5 COLLER ON
BANKR PTcY 1129.03, at 1129-66 to -67 (15th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as COLLER].
3. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 524-25 (1941).
4. J. LORIE & M. HAMITON, TiE STOCK MARKET-THEoRmS AND EVIDENCE 6 (1973).
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the corporation's shares.'
In periods of economic inflation, income forecasts convention-
ally include allowances for anticipated cost and price increases
commensurate with the rate of inflation.' As illustrated by the
forecasts used to value stock in two recent reorganization cases,
the nominally increased net income expected to be derived from
such allowances can be an important component of a firm's future
earnings estimate. In these, as in most recent corporate reorganiza-
tion cases, the courts, prompted by advisory opinions of the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC),' employed a formula for
determining the present worth of the companies' continuing opera-
tions that was said to yield a reorganization value, as distinguished
from an immediate market value. The reorganization value
formula calculates an average of the estimated annual future earn-
ings of the firm and then discounts that expectancy to its present
worth. The discount rate is derived from an average of the ratios of
the earnings to the market prices per share of the common stocks
of other companies engaged in the same industry.' In both recent
reorganization cases the courts, by including allowances for infla-
tion in the future earnings estimates, partially offset the effect of
the discounting and thus increased the resultant reorganization
value.10
5. See generally In re Muskegon Motor Specialties, 366 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1966).
6. In re Duplan Corp., SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 323, in 20 SEC
Docket 189, App. B at 216, 221 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Duplan Release]; In re Interstate
Stores, Inc., SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 322, in 13 SEC Docket 757, 771
n.21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Interstate Release].
7. In re Duplan Corp., 9 B.R. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Interstate Stores, Inc. 15
C.B.C. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
8. Section 172 of the former Bankruptcy Act, Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 172, 30
Stat. 544 (repealed 1978), required that whenever the indebtedness of the reorganized firm
exceeded $3,000,000, the court must submit the reorganization plan to the SEC for examina-
tion and the SEC, in turn, must submit an advisory report to the court. That requirement
has been deleted by the Bankruptcy Code. Under § 1109 of the Code, however, the SEC
may still appear and be heard on any issue in a Chapter 11 case. 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (Supp. Il
1979).
9. Earnings to price ratios and their reciprocal price to earnings ratios have been used
by reorganization courts in valuation formulae for some time. See, e.g., In re Imperial '400'
Nat'l Inc., 374 F. Supp. 949, 974-75 (D.N.J. 1974); In re Yuba Consol. Indus., Inc., 242 F.
Supp. 561, 566-67 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
10. This approach has received a great deal of judicial attention in recent damage
award cases. See Note, Future Inflation, Prospective Damages, and the Circuit Courts, 63
VA. L. REv. 105 (1977). Normally, an injured wage earner will receive, as compensatory dam-
ages for his lost future income, a lump sum representing the amount of that prospective
income, reduced to its present worth at a discount rate equal to the current risk-free rate of
interest. Because of inflationary trends, some courts have compensated plaintiffs further
1728
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This Recent Development examines the validity of this
formula, with and without allowances for future inflation, as a tool
for valuing the stock to be distributed to creditors in corporate re-
organization proceedings. This discussion considers the valuation
method both under Chapter 11 of the new Bankruptcy Code and
under Chapter X of the now superseded Bankruptcy Act, which is
still effective in many pending cases. 1 The Recent Development
describes the purpose and effects of equity share valuations in
bankruptcy reorganization proceedings, compares the methods
that have been used by the courts with methods used by investors
to ascertain the investment value of equity securities, and traces
the evolution in reorganization courts of the now most common
method of determining reorganization value. It then explains how
the use of that method, particularly in conjunction with inflation-
inclusive earnings forecasts, can result in overstated stock values.
Finally, the Recent Development suggests workable alternatives
that would avoid such overstatement without, on the other hand,
equating the investment value of the shares to their immediate
market value.
I. PURPOSE AND EFFECTS OF VALUATION
A. The Doctrine of Absolute Priority
The reorganization of a corporation in a rehabilitative bank-
ruptcy proceeding serves two important purposes: To keep the en-
terprise alive by restructuring its financial liabilities,"2 and to com-
pensate as fully as possible those claimants for whom immediate
payment is not feasible by allowing them, through the ownership
of securities, to share in the firm's future revenues.' 3 Generally, a
with a premium to cover expected increases in their nominal wages as the purchasing power
of the dollar declines. The premium offsets the effect of the discounting and yields a higher
award. See, e.g., Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980). Other courts
reject that procedure as requiring economic speculation beyond the scope of judicial compe-
tence. See, e.g., Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 644 F.2d 460, 463-65 (5th Cir. 1981); Johnson v.
Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1975). The issue of judicial competence is
not to be addressed here. This Recent Development focuses instead on whether courts, in
valuing a reorganized firm, are making adjustments for expected inflation in a correct
manner.
11. Reorganization cases commenced prior to October 1, 1979, will continue to be gov-
erned by Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. See note 1 supra. Because of their complexity,
reorganization cases are usually not resolved for many years.
12. E. BRIGHAM, FINANcIAL MANAGEMENT-THEoRY & PRACTICE 792 (1977); Blum, Full
Priority and Full Compensation in Corporate Reorganizations-A Reappraisal, 25 U. CHL
L. REv. 417, 418 (1958).
13. See generally 5 COLLIER, supra note 2, 1129.03, at 1129-66 to -74. See also
1981] 1729
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court will not confirm a plan of reorganization unless the value of
the firm as a continuing enterprise exceeds the liquidation value of
its assets."4
A corporation usually enters into a bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding with a complex financial structure. In addition to com-
mon stock, it may have outstanding issues of preferred stock and
various debt securities as well as bank and trade debt. The priority
of each claim against the firm's assets is specified by bankruptcy
law.' 5 Generally, in a liquidation proceeding the assets of the firm
must be applied to the full repayment of its debts before its equity
shareholders may receive anything.16 Secured creditors have a first
claim on their collateral, 1 and certain classes of creditors, includ-
ing wage and tax claimants, are afforded priority rights in bank-
ruptcy over other unsecured creditors.' 8 Under trust indentures,
the holders of debentures may be subordinated in right of payment
to the claims of all other creditors, and other debt instruments
may provide for their subordination to the claims of a specific
creditor class, such as bank creditors.19
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act required the courts to find a
reorganization plan "fair and equitable" as a prerequisite to judi-
cial confirmation. 0 The Supreme Court interpreted this require-
ment as embracing the doctrine of absolute priority: junior claim-
ants might receive distributions under the plan only if the
claimants senior in rank received full compensation for the value
of their claims; otherwise the plan had to be rejected.2' Chapter 11
Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganization Act, 48 HARV. L. REV. 39, 77
(1934).
14. W. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS 210 (1978).
15. See Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorganiza-
tions, 41 U. CHi. L. REV. 651, 654 (1974). See also Citibank, N.A. v. Baer, 651 F.2d 1341
(10th Cir. 1980); In re Duplan Corp., 9 B.R. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Investors Funding
Corp. of N.Y., 8 B.R. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
16. In re Muskegon Motor Specialties, 366 F.2d 522, 525 (6th Cir. 1966).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (Supp. I1 1979); Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 57, 30 Stat. 560
(current version at 11 U.S.C. § 506 (Supp. 1I 1979)). For a discussion of the rights of se-
cured creditors in bankruptcy cases, see Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram
Down under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 150-59 (1979).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. III 1979); Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 64, 30 Stat. 560
(current version at 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. III 1979)).
19. See In re Duplan Corp., 9 B.R. 921, 923, 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
20. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 221, 30 Stat. 560 (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979)).
21. Thus, for example, creditors who hold a security interest in assets of the debtor
should rank ahead of all other creditors with respect to those assets. Following secured
creditors, the general unsecured creditors are entitled to payment in full before any-
1730 [Vol. 34:1727
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of the new Bankruptcy Code modifies that requirement to some
extent. The new Code permits the court to confirm a plan even if
the absolute priority doctrine is not honored, so long as all ad-
versely affected creditor classes vote in favor of the plan. If any
adversely affected class dissents, the doctrine must be satisfied
with respect to that class and all classes junior to it. 22
B. Full Compensation and the Concept of Reorganization
Value
Because of the relationship between the pre-petition financial
structure of the corporation and the doctrine of absolute priority,
the value assigned to a firm's continuing operations can determine
whether a class of claimants will receive distributions under a reor-
ganization plan.23 The absolute priority doctrine requires the court
to consider the relative status of each creditor and stockholder
class, and then to assess their respective claims to any assets and
securities available for distribution on the same basis as if the firm
were being liquidated rather than reorganized. 24 If the firm is in-
solvent (i.e., if the reorganization value of its assets is less than the
allowed claims of its creditors), the pre-petition stockholders will
be barred, and, depending on the amount of the deficiency, junior
creditor classes may also be excluded.25 The higher the reorganiza-
tion value assigned to the continuing operations, the greater the
chances that junior claimants will receive a portion of the firm's
reorganization securities.
The reorganization valuation process necessarily relies on in-
formed but inexact predictions and estimates, and critics have
charged that some courts have manipulated the process to obtain a
desired result.26 Commentators have noted that the courts, out of
sympathy for junior creditors or stockholders, may exaggerate pro-
thing may be allocated to other creditors whose claims may be subordinated by express
agreement or otherwise. Finally, after all creditors are paid, and only then, may provi-
sion be made for stockholders.
In re Equity Funding Corp. of America, 416 F. Supp. 132, 145 (C.D. Cal. 1975). See also
Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 441 (1968); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v.
Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 527 (1941); SEC v. United States Realty and Improvement Co., 310
U.S. 434, 452 (1940); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-19 (1939).
22. In re Landau Boat Co., 7 B.C.D. 255, 256 (W.D. Mo. 1981); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)
(Supp. III 1979). See generally Pachulski, supra note 1, at 944-50.
23. See Blum & Kaplan, supra note 15, at 656.
24. See W. SHARPE, supra note 14, at 210.
25. Moulded Prods., Inc. v. Barry, 474 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1973).
26. See, e.g., Gardner, The SEC and Valuation under Chapter X, 91 U. PA. L. REv.
440, 450-53 (1943).
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spective earnings or apply a high capitalization rate in order to
reach a level of value that will avoid freezing out these classes.27 In
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois28 the Supreme Court
cautioned against this practice: "[U]nless meticulous regard for
earning capacity be had, indefensible participation of junior securi-
ties in plans of reorganization may result. . . .If [creditors] re-
ceive less than full compensatory treatment, some of their property
rights will be appropriated for the benefit of stockholders without
compensation. That is not permissible." 9 If the "full compensa-
tion" to creditors is to be in the form of new securities, the Court
warned, then such securities must be "of a value equal to the cred-
itors' claims."30
Consolidated Rock did not specifically address the problem in-
herent in appraising reorganization securities for which there is no
market data-that the securities might not achieve a market price
equal to their judicially determined worth. Although a court might
fairly assess the new securities upon well-informed predictions of
earninga, the discounted present worth of those earnings might not
correspond to an immediately realizable cash value of the shares
distributed to senior claimants as "full compensation."3 1 Recogniz-
ing this potential disparity, the Court, in Group of Institutional
Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railway,3 2
held that senior claimants of the reorganized firm could neverthe-
less be deemed fully compensated by the distribution of stock of
an "equitable," rather than a cash, equivalence to their prior
claims.33
In light of the Supreme Court pronouncements, reorganization
courts have struggled to define the proper relationship between the
judicial concept of reorganization value and the ultimate reality of
market value. In In re Equity Funding Corp. of Americas' a dis-
trict court stated that while temporary market conditions were not
2.7. See Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. Cm. L.
REv. 565, 595-96 (1950); Gardner, supra note 26, at 449-50.
28. 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
29. Id. at 525-26, 529.
30. Id. at 529-30.
31. "In the short term, at least, one would expect investors to demand a higher rate of
return than is available from investments in the 'comparable' companies to compensate
them for the greater present risk of investing in the resuscitated debtor." Pachulski, supra
note 1, at 942.
32. 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
33. Id. at 565-66.
34. 391 F. Supp. 768 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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determinative, "reorganization value is intended to approach the
value that would prevail in a perfect market adequately stocked
with willing and informed buyers and sellers. '3 5 In a later decision
the same court defined reorganization value as "the best estimate
of value the marketplace would put on a company comparable to
[the reorganized company]," adding that "because of uncertainties
associated with a company emerging from [reorganization] pro-
ceedings, [and] possible initial selling pressure . . . individual
shares of stock of [the reorganized company] may trade in the near
future at less than reorganization value."36 In In re Imperial '400'
National Inc.37 another district court also concluded that the reor-
ganization value of a stock was tied to its investment value rather
than to its market price.3 8
It is evident that courts are more concerned with a reorganiza-
tion security's investment value in the long run than its short-term
market price.39 As a result, courts must struggle with the uncertain
meaning of "long run." Theoretically, a court could justify almost
any value for a security on the basis that the selected price should
(or could) eventually be obtained in the market. Creditors might
then have to wait indefinitely before "full compensation" could be
reduced to cash. One noted commentator, however, has suggested
that if the firm is given a realistic valuation, and if it realizes its
projected earnings, the reorganization securities should reach their
long-run investment value in the "not too distant future. '40 The
earnings estimate is only one of the variables in the valuation
formula that will determine whether that goal is achieved.
C. Elements of Valuation
1. Capitalization of Prospective Earnings
In Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois the Supreme
Court repeated Justice Holmes' earlier statement that "the com-
mercial value of property consists in the expectation of income
from it."'41 With that principle in mind, the Court established the
35. Id. at 773.
36. In re Equity Funding Corp. of America, 416 F. Supp. 132, 145 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
37. 374 F. Supp. 949 (D.N.J. 1974).
38. Id. at 978. The court stated, "No matter how carefully I may calculate 'value', I
have no control over what may happen to price in the public market. But my concern under
the Bankruptcy Act is value and not price." Id.
39. See Blum, supra note 12, at 430.
40. Id. at 436-37.
41. 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941) (quoting Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S.
19811 1733
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rule that a reorganized enterprise, and hence its equity securities,
must be valued by capitalizing (i.e., discounting) 42 its prospective
earnings to their present worth.4 3 While conceding that any esti-
mate of a firm's future earnings is a matter of informed judgment
rather than certitude, the Court insisted that these estimations are
necessary for a fair valuation of the ongoing enterprise.
Three variables must be considered in calculating the present
worth of a firm's income expectancy: The projected annual earn-
ings of the firm (usually averaged to simplify computation), the
projected duration of the earnings, and the discount rate to be ap-
plied.45 Once these are known, the present value may be computed
by use of the following equation:
Se e e1+d (1+d) (1+d)3 .(1+d)n
Here, PV is present value, e is average yearly earnings, d is the
percentage discount rate stated as a decimal, and n is the number
of years_the earnings will continue. 46 Under this formula, if a reor-
ganized firm is expected to earn $100 per year for 10 years, then at
a discount rate of 10% (.10) its present value is $614.46. If 100
equity shares are to be distributed to creditors, the present value
per share approximates $6.14. 4
This formula should be used to calculate present value of a
company's stock when earnings are expected to be of limited dura-
tion. For example, use of the formula would be appropriate in situ-
ations when a firm's sources of revenue are subject to depletion.48
The life and earnings of a business corporation, however, are more
frequently assumed to be perpetual. In these more common cases
present value may be calculated by simply dividing the firm's aver-
age yearly earnings expectancy by the chosen discount rate (i.e.,
217, 226 (1908)).
42. A capitalization rate is the same as a discount rate and the two terms are often
used interchangeably. See E. BRIGHAM, supra note 12, at 909, 911.
43. 312 U.S. at 525.
44. Id. at 526.
45. See Blum, supra note 27, at 573-75.
46. The formula may also be expressed as follows:
1-(l+d)-n
PV = e d
47. Often the value placed upon reorganization securities will reflect not only going
concern value, but also other corporate property such as excess real estate or excess cash,
which is separately appraised and added. See In re Imperial '400' Nat'l Inc., 374 F. Supp.
949, 975 (D.N.J. 1974).
48. See In re King Resources Co., 651 F.2d 1326, 1333 (10th Cir. 1980).
1734 [Vol. 34:1727
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PV =Id, or, alternatively, by multiplying the same expectancy by
the reciprocal of the same discount rate (i.e., PV = e X Ild. If the
firm is expected to earn $100 per year indefinitely and the discount
rate is 10%, then its present value is $1f)}/i, or $1,000. The discount
rate is equivalent to the fraction 10/,., of which the reciprocal is
100/,, or the whole number 10. Multiplying the $100 annual earnings
by 10 yields the same present value of $1,000. Many reorganization
courts prefer the latter method.49
2. Function of the Discount Rate
In the present-worth valuation of any business, the choice of
the discount rate (or multiplier) is of obvious importance. The rate
chosen must discount for both the simple time value of money (the
risk-free rate of return) and the risk that the firm may not achieve
its projected earnings (the return for risk).5 0 The discount rate,
therefore, must reflect the percentage return that a hypothetical
investor, knowing all of the facts available to the court, would ex-
pect on every dollar presently invested in the reorganized com-
pany. To attract such an investor, the reorganization securities
would have to offer the same prospective return as might be
achieved through investment in the securities of other firms en-
gaged in commercial activities of similar risk.5 1 As the risk in-
creases, all other things being equal, the required rate of return
also increases, and, conversely, the present worth of the firm's se-
curities declines.52 Raising the discount rate by one percentage
point (or reducing the multiplier by an equivalent fraction) may
eliminate an entire class of claimants from participation in the
ownership of the securities of the firm. Lowering the discount rate
(or raising the multiplier) may have the opposite effect. Thus, val-
49. See, e.g., In re Muskegon Motor Specialties, 366 F.2d 522, 527 (6th Cir. 1966); In
re Equity Funding Corp. of America, 416 F. Supp. 132, 144 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
50. For a definition of risk-adjusted discount rates, see E. BRIGHAM, supra note 12, at
918. See also J. LORI. & M. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 127; Pachulski, supra note 1, at 940.
The risk-free rate of interest is the rate available on a monetarily default-proof security,
such as a treasury bill, upon which the nominal income stream is certain. Since investors are
risk-averse, any security whose income stream is subject to uncertainty must offer a rate of
return higher than the risk-free rate. See E. BRIGHAM, supra note 12, at 111-12.
51. See In re Equity Funding Corp. of America, 391 F. Supp. 768, 772 (C.D. Cal.
1975). If two securities are subject to the same degree of risk, the investor will choose the
one offering a higher expected rate of return. E. BRIGHAM, supra note 12, at 111-15.
52. A required rate of return is the minimum expected return that investors will ac-
cept from a particular security. If the required return exceeds the return that the investor
actually expects to receive, he will sell the security. E. BRIGHAM, supra note 12, at 111. See
also J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 7; W. SHARPE, supra note 14, at 309.
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uation controversies often center on the question of the rate to be
chosen.
Early reorganization courts sometimes determined the dis-
count rates without reference to market data. The courts instead
selected the rate simply by relying on impressions derived from
dealing with the debtor's affairs over a period of time.53 Recently,
in In re King Resources Co. 4 one court approached the valuation
problem more objectively, in much the same manner as an invest-
ment analyst seeking to ascertain the investment value of a new
security. The district court determined that the appropriate dis-
count rate for the oil exploration corporation was 14.5%. The court
derived the rate from expert testimony that the required rate of
return for business equity investments is generally about 2% per
annum above the prime interest rate.5 5 The court added this 2%
figure to the then-existing 7.5% prime rate. Then adding 5% for a
risk premium and for potential depletion of the debtor company's
resources 56 to the 9.5% equity investment rate, the court arrived at
the 14.5% discount rate. The court then used that 14.5% rate to
capitalize the projected earnings to present worth over a 20-year
period.5 7 The Tenth Circuit explicitly approved" the method em-
ployed in King Resources. This method, however, is not typical of
those now used in reorganization cases.
For guidance in choosing an appropriate discount rate, most
courts now refer to the price-earnings (P/E) ratios of the shares of
corporations in the same business as the reorganized firm.59 By ex-
amining the level at which investors price the stock of comparable
firms with proven earnings records, the courts try to estimate the
rate of return that investors would have expected from the shares
of the reorganized enterprise if it had not been involved in bank-
53. 5 COLLIER, supra note 2, 1129.03, at 1129-69 to -71; Gardner, supra note 26, at
453-64.
54. 651 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1980).
55. The prime interest rate is "the lowest rate of interest commercial banks charge
very large, strong corporations." E. BRIGHAM, supra note 12, at 917.
56. 651 F.2d at 1336 n.7.
57. Id. at 1337 n.12. The district court tested the accuracy of the 14.5% discount rate
by comparing it to earnings-price multiples of other oil companies. Id.
58. "[W]e are satisfied that the trial judge's findings on valuation. . . are amply sup-
ported by the record and find no legal error in the route he took to conclude that the com-
pany was insolvent." Id. at 1338.
59. See In re Equity Funding Corp. of America, 391 F. Supp. 768, 772 (C.D. Cal.
1975); In re Imperial '400' Nat'l Inc., 374 F. Supp. 949, 973-74 (D.N.J. 1974); In re Yuba
Consol. Indus., Inc., 242 F. Supp., 561, 566-67 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
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ruptcy proceedings."0 The courts reason that if the reorganized
firm's earnings prospects have been fairly measured, the calcula-
tion of the present value of those earnings, utilizing a capitaliza-
tion rate equivalent to a return average for the industry, should
yield a price that market investors would be willing to pay in the
not too distant future.6"
For example, if the reorganized firm manufactures toys, the
court can examine the current and historical P/E ratios of several
other toy companies and by averaging them derive a representative
ratio or range of ratios for the entire industry. If toy stocks cur-
rently sell at 5-times present earnings, and industry earnings are
expected to remain constant, then an investor would expect a per-
petual 20% annual return on every dollar presently invested. 2 The
reciprocal of the P/E ratio (i.e., the earnings-price ratio) is 1/5 or
20%-the required rate of return. If the court finds the 20% rate
to be an accurate reflection of the risks and rewards that the mar-
ket associates with investment in the reorganized firm, then the
court may choose 20% as the discount rate. The court can use the
reciprocal multiplier of 5 to capitalize the average annual earnings
expectancy, as derived from realistic projections over a three to
five year period. 3 If the court determines that the equity shares of
the reorganized firm are more prone to risk than those of the typi-
cal toy company, it may take this risk into account by choosing a
60. See generally cases cited note 59 supra. The SEC also has adopted this method of
estimating rates of return. "Prices actually being paid for equivalent commodities are the
best evidence of the yield that should be employed in determining current capital values of
projected income." Duplan Release, supra note 6, at 199.
61. See Blum, supra note 12, at 436-37.
62. A P/E ratio may be converted into a whole or mixed number that can be used as a
multiplier of earnings. The reciprocal of the P/E ratio, that is, the earnings-price ratio, is
used as a discount rate or required rate of return. As the required rate of return increases,
the multiplier decreases. If a stock sells at 6-times earnings, courts assume that investors
expect a 16.6% rate of return. If it sells at 5-times earnings, investors are presumed to
expect a 20% annual return. See Duplan Release, supra note 6, at 199.
63. In effect, the court discounts the firm's future earnings into perpetuity at 20%. If a
security is to be valued into perpetuity, and if its future annual earnings are assumed to be
constant, present worth can be calculated by multiplying the annual earnings by the recip-
rocal of the chosen discount rate. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra. Courts rarely
translate industry P/E ratios explicitly into required rates of return. Rather, courts use the
ratios as guides in determining the appropriate multiplier for the debtor firm's average earn-
ings expectancy. Typically, a court will determine the reorganization value by averaging pro-
jected earnings over a three to five year period, and then multiplying that average by the
chosen multiplier. Thus, if the debtor firm is expected to earn an average of $1,000,000 per
year and the court chooses 5 as the appropriate multiplier, the reorganization value is
$5,000,000.
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multiplier lower than the industry average."'
Even with this risk adjustment, two problems remain when
courts use industry P/E ratios as multipliers for capitalizing the
prospective earnings of reorganized corporations: if applied to its
future earnings expectancy, a firm's P/E ratio will yield an esti-
mate of its future value rather than of its present worth,65 and that
estimate of future value will vary depending on the extent that the
earnings estimate has been increased by an allowance for expected
inflation.
D. Inflation and Valuation
The real rate of interest on debt securities bearing no risk of
default 6 is both relatively low and relatively constant. The nomi-
nal market rate of interest on such securities, however, includes
the highly variable expected rate of inflation." This nominal risk-
free rate represents the time value of money and, as previously dis-
cussed, is a necessary component of the discount or capitalization
rate used in valuing a reorganized firm." As the risk-free rate in-
creases, the discount rate and, hence, the required rate of return
for the firm also increase.6 9 A significant increase in the required
rate of return attributed to inflationary expectations is generally
accompanied by a proportional increase in the firm's nominal in-
come expectancy. The additional nominal earnings, however, ap-
64. This method of compensating for added risk has been employed in several cases.
For example, in In re Keeshin Freight Lines, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Ill. 1949), the
district court rejected a proposal that an industry multiple of 6.66 should be used in capital-
izing the debtor's expected future earnings, stating that
[i]t is reasonable to assume that if the stocks of such [major concerns] with a very
favorable and impressive past earnings record for many years, are selling on a basis of
five or six times earnings, then, in arriving at the enterprise valuation of a company
such as Keeshin, with its past history of enormous deficits, that the price-earnings mul-
tiplier to be applied to Keeshin should be considerably less than that used by market
investors in purchasing [the industry leaders'] stock.
Id. at 445. In In re Imperial '400' Nat'l Inc., 374 F. Supp. 949, 974 (D.N.J. 1974), the district
court rejected a suggested industry multiplier because the proponent, in computing it, had
distorted the average by including a firm with an abnormally high multiple.
65. See W. SHARPE, supra note 14, at 308-10.
66. See note 50 supra.
67. E. BRIGHAM, supra note 12, at 115-17; W. SHARPE, supra note 14, at 167-68;
Formuzis & O'Donnell, Inflation and the Valuation of Future Economic Losses, 38 MoNT.
L. REv. 297, 299-300 (1977). The nominal rate is the monetary rate of interest, that is, the
rate of interest expressed in dollar terms. W. SHARPE, supra note 14, at 167.
68. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text; E. BRIGHAM, supra note 12, at 163;
W. SHARPE, supra note 14, at 26-40.
69. E. BRIGHAM, supra note 12, at 115-16.
1738 [Vol. 34:1727
REORGANIZATION VALUE
proximately offset the effect of the increased discount rate, leaving
the present value of the firm substantially unchanged.70 This result
can be demonstrated by use of the following equation:
e(l+g) e(l+g)2  e(l+g)3 e(l+g)n
PV = (1+d) (1+d)2 (1+d)3 (1+d)n
Here, PV is present value, e is average yearly earnings, d is the
discount rate expressed as a decimal, g is the rate of nominal infla-
tionary growth expected by investors expressed as a decimal, and n
is the expected life of the firm in years.71 In the absence of infla-
tion, real and nominal earnings would be equal, and a firm pro-
jected to earn $100 per year for three years, discounted at 10%,
would be valued at $249.72 If the risk-free rate of interest were to
increase by 5% due to expectations of inflation, then the correct
discount rate would be 15%. Projected nominal income would also
be increased by 5% per year, resulting in an adjusted projected
nominal income of $105 in the first year, $110.25 in the second,
and $115.76 in the third. By then discounting that nominal income
at the 15% rate, one obtains approximately the same present
value, or $250.73
A simpler adjustment for expected price level changes is ac-
complished by leaving the original (real) earnings projection un-
changed and by eliminating the inflationary component of the new
discount rate. 4 Thus, in the above example, instead of increasing
projected income by 5% per year to adjust for expected inflation,
the court could directly offset the new 15 % discount rate by lower-
ing it to 10%. Present value could then be computed by applying
70. W. SHARPE, supra note 14, at 308-10. Sharpe suggests that unless a firm is ex-
pected to gain or lose from inflation, the value of its stock should remain unchanged. While
inflation may not always increase stock prices, common stocks generally do produce higher
real rates of return than are available on debt securities. J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra
note 4, at 17-20; B. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 221-22 (2d rev. ed.
1975).
71. See W. SHARPE, supra note 14, at 310-11. The model in the text is based on the
constant growth stock valuation method described by Sharpe, using inflation as a nominal
growth rate and assuming that all earnings are paid out as dividends. This model is similar
to one already used by courts in adjusting damage awards for inflation. See Note, supra
note 10, at 110-11. The economic principles involved in personal injury damage award com-
putations are analogous to those involved in enterprise valuation, except that the lost in-
come of an injured wage earner is discounted by the risk-free rate alone, with no risk pre-
mium added.
72. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
73. Id.
74. See Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1293-94 (D. Conn.
1974), modified, 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975); Note, supra note 10, at 110-11, 130.
1981] 1739
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
this 10% discount rate to the original earnings forecast since that
earnings projection also did not account for inflation. As noted,
this calculation yields a present value of $249. Valued in
perpetuity, under either method the firm's present worth is e/d.g or
$1,000." Using either method, inflationary expectations have no
significant effect upon the firm's present value.
Economists, by averaging historical differences between risk-
free rates of interest and price-level changes, have derived varying
estimates of what they believe to be a constant real rate of inter-
est."' Courts have used their findings as an aid in computing dam-
age awards." A recent example is Doca v. Marina Mercante Ni-
caraguense, S.A.,78 a personal injury case in which the Second
Circuit put the economic data to practical application. Seeking a
method to account for expected inflation in the computation of
damage awards for lost future wages, the court chose to adjust the
discount rate rather than to increase the projected real earnings for
inflation. According to the Second Circuit, this approach "avoids
all predictions about the level of future inflation and focuses in-
stead only on the relationship between the inflation rate and the
interest rate.'7 9 Citing various economic studies, the court deter-
mined that approximately 2% per annum was the real time value
of money and, thus, was the proper discount rate for determining
the present value of a real income expectancy.80
In Doca the Second Circuit appropriately employed economic
theory and data to simplify present value calculations and to avoid
speculation about future inflation rates. Two recent reorganization
cases suggest that while inflation has become an important com-
ponent of enterprise valuation, bankruptcy courts have been less
successful than the Doca court in avoiding inflationary distortions
when calculating the present worth of future income
expectancies.81
75. See J. FRANCIS, INVESTMENTS: ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, 266-77 (1976).
76. Estimates of the constant real rate of interest have ranged from 1.2% to 4%. See
Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 39 n.10 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 2049 (1981); W. SHARPE, supra note 14, at 168-70.
77. See, e.g., Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Conn. 1974),
modified, 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975).
78. 634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2049 (1981).
79. Id. at 39.
80. Id.
81. See notes 82-131 infra and accompanying text.
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III. Interstate, Duplan, AND INFLATIONARY ADJUSTMENTS
In In re Interstate Stores, Inc.,82 a case concerning the valua-
tion of a reorganized department store chain, the bankruptcy court
did not explicitly address the problem of how properly to account
for inflation. Inflation, however, did figure in the court's calcula-
tions. The court, relying on managerial data, projected and aver-
aged the firm's income over a four year period."' It then examined
the average P/E ratios of six other department store chains 84 and
determined that the representative industry average was 9.85 Be-
cause the six "comparable" companies had each shown higher
growth rates and earnings than the debtor firm, the court held that
a lower multiplier of 888 would be appropriate for Interstate as re-
organized.87 It then multiplied the average of the projected annual
earnings by 8 to arrive at Interstate's going concern value.8 Ac-
cording to the SEC's advisory report,8 9 the earnings forecasts that
the court accepted from the company's management included an
inflation allowance of from 5 to 6 % per year.90 Therefore, when the
court multiplied the nominal earnings expectancy by 8, its infla-
tionary component was also multiplied.
The court in In re Duplan Corp.1 also used income forecasts
expressed in nominal (inflation increased) rather than real (con-
stant value) dollars. The reorganization of Duplan required the
valuation of two operating divisions. The apparel manufacturing
division9 2 projected that its nominal income would increase over a
four year period,s not only as a result of increased sales, but also
82. 15 C.B.C. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
83. The court adopted the trustee's average of four fiscal years ending February 3,
1980 and estimated future annual earnings at $13,800,000. Id. at 653.
84. Id. at 654. The SEC advisory report indicates that the companies cited as compa-
rable included Child World, Tandy, Payless Cashways, Pay 'n Pak, Best Products, and Ser-
vice Merchandise. Interstate Release, supra note 6, at 776.
85. 15 C.B.C. at 655.
86. The multiplier of 8 is equivalent to a perpetual discount rate of 12.5%.
87. 15 C.B.C. at 654-58.
88. The court's initial determination of Interstate's going concern value was
$109,460,000, although the estimated average earnings of $13,800,000 when multiplied by 8
yield a value of $110,400,000. Id. at 655. The court later stated that the going concern value
should be increased by $1,740,000 to reflect interest income for fiscal 1978 and 1979. Id. at
657.
89. For an explanation of SEC advisory reports, see note 8 supra.
90. Interstate Release, supra note 6, at 771 n.21.
91. 9 B.R. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
92. This division included Wundies Inc. and Kickaway Corporation.
93. The court adopted income projections for the years 1980 through 1983. 9 B.R. at
926.
19811 1741
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
because of annual inflationary increases.9 4 The button manufactur-
ing division 95 made its four year earnings projections by assuming
a 2% per annum real growth in sales volume over and above a
7.5% per annum nominal gain attributable to inflation.9 6 The
court, by accepting a consolidation of the two forecasts 9 7 esti-
mated Duplan's average future annual earnings at $2,890,000.98 It
then reviewed the market data for fifteen other textile and apparel
concerns 99 over the prior five year period °0 and found that the av-
erage of their P/E ratios ranged from a low of 5.1 to a high of
6.3.101 Because Duplan was smaller and of less proven stability
than any of the other companies,0 and because the firm that com-
peted most directly with Duplan'0 had an average P/E ratio of
only 4.9,104 the court selected 5 as the appropriate multiplier for
capitalizing Duplan's annual future income expectancy. The court
observed that this relatively low multiplier also reflected the un-
certainties inherent in the earnings forecasts. 10 5 By multiplying the
projected average earnings by 5, the court arrived at its conclusion
that Duplan's reorganization value was approximately
$14,450,000.106
Senior noteholders of Duplan,1°7 who were to be compensated
under the reorganization plan with common stock valued in con-
formity with the court's analysis, objected that the stock was over-
valued. They argued that since the multiplier chosen by the court
was based on the present P/E ratios of comparable firms, the mul-
tiplier would be valid only if applied to the achieved earnings-not
the projected earnings-of Duplan.l0 8 The noteholders further
94. Duplan Release, supra note 6, at 216.
95. This division included Rochester Button Company and Kitchener Button Indus-
tries, Ltd.
96. Duplan Release, supra note 6, at 221.
97. Id. at 195-96.
98. 9 B.R. at 926, 928.
99. Id. at 926. The court relied on the reorganization trustee's economic data.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Duplan Release, supra note 6, at 196.
103. House of Ronnie, Inc. was Duplan's most direct competitor. Duplan Release,
supra note 6, at 196.
104. 9 B.R. at 926-27.
105. Id. at 927-28.
106. The court adopted the $14,450,000 figure on the recommendation of the reorgani-
zation trustee. See Duplan Release, supra note 6, at 196.
107. The Gal-Lazare Group of Senior Subordinated Noteholders objected to the plan.
9 B.R. at 925-26.
108. Id. at 927. The noteholders were not entirely accurate, since historical as well as
[Vol. 34:17271742
REORGANIZATION VALUE
urged that since P/E ratios already reflect an expectation by inves-
tors of future earnings, the court's multiplication of Duplan's
higher expected earnings by the P/E ratio gave double effect to the
same expectations. 109 The noteholders criticized the inclusion of
inflationary adjustments in the earnings forecasts as an unsup-
ported assumption concerning the future economy.110 They asked
either that a lower multiplier be used or that the projected average
earnings be discounted to present value before applying the
multiplier.""'
The court rejected the noteholders' arguments. Citing Consoli-
dated Rock,1 2 the court held that Duplan's reorganization value
must be calculated not upon its actual earnings achievements, but
only upon its projected future income. 113 The court, citing Doca,
insisted that a provision for expected inflation was properly in-
cluded in the earnings projections: "Inflation will inevitably re-
quire Duplan to raise its prices as it keeps pace with rising costs.
The marketplace necessarily enters this factor into its calculation
of a company's value. It is therefore a necessary element of earn-
ings projections."1 1 4
IV. ANALYSIS
To avoid erring in the valuation of reorganization shares to be
distributed to creditors, a court must do more than assess the cor-
poration's future income prospects as accurately as possible with
proper allowance for inflation. The court must also choose a dis-
count rate (or multiplier) that reflects both the current risk-free
rate of interest and a risk premium for the uncertainty of the pro-
jected income. 5 Rates of return on equity investments are estab-
lished in the market through this type of analysis."" Indeed, this
method is really the only proper way to discount the income expec-
tancy of a reorganized firm. Only if the courts follow this analysis
will the discount rate correctly offset the inclusion of inflationary
allowances in the earnings projections and will a true present value
present ratios of the comparison firms were examined. Id. at 926.
109. Id. at 927.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
113. 9 B.R. at 927-28.
114. Id. at 928.
115. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
116. E. BRIGHAM, supra note 12, at 113-18.
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be obtained.
A multiplier based on industry P/E ratios cannot properly be
used to capitalize either an inflationary or a real income expec-
tancy. A company's P/E ratio is merely a comparison between the
current market price of its stock and its most recently reported
earnings per share. The market price represents a consensus
among investors of the stock's value. The present earnings per
share is but one of several considerations that investors have taken
into account. Investors, for example, also consider their own pro-
jections of future growth in earnings. 117 The P/E rAtio, therefore, is
the dependent variable in the valuation process.11 8 The P/E ratio
does not create the price-it exists because of it.
The use of P/E ratios as future earnings multipliers requires
the assumption that investors price stocks by discounting an earn-
ings stream that is both constant and perpetual without making
any allowance for either real or inflationary growth. If that were
the way investors priced stocks, the ratios would reflect the dis-
count rates that investors use to determine the present value of
their future expectancies.1 9 In a world without inflation, if a
debtor firm were in an industry with little or no real growth, the
use of P/E ratios as future earnings multipliers would produce only
negligible discrepancies between the reorganization value thus cal-
culated and the actual present worth. In that situation the real
earnings of all representative companies could be expected to be
constant from year to year, and one could legitimately assume that
"the market multiplier for current earnings does not vary substan-
tially from the multiplier investors are using in pricing foreseeable
earnings." 120
The economic environment in which the market valuation pro-
cess occurs, however, is not this simple. Investors rarely assume
that a firm's most recently reported earnings will continue at the
same level into perpetuity; rather they anticipate earnings growth
117. See W. SHARPE, supra note 14, at 23.
118. J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 136.
119. The present value of a constant perpetual annual stream of earnings is equal to
the yearly earnings divided by the discount rate (e/d) or multiplied by the reciprocal of the
discount rate (e X lid). Thus, if all investors expect a particular stock to earn $10 a year
forever and all investors discount those future earnings at a rate of .10, the present value of
the stock will be $100. The P/E ratio would be 100/ o. The reciprocal of that P/E ratio
(/1.) is equivalent to tW-lierpetua discount rate (.10) investors used in determining pre-
sent value.
120. Blum, Corporate Reorganization Doctrine as Recently Applied by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 96, 99 (1972).
1744 [Vol. 34:1727
REORGANIZATION VALUE
or decline.121 If a firm has growth prospects, either real or inflation-
ary, the ratio of current price to current earnings per share will
exceed the ratio of current price to estimated future earnings per
share. When real or inflationary growth is anticipated, the multi-
plication of next year's expected earnings by this year's P/E ratio
will yield a measure of future rather than present value.122 Thus,
when the courts in Interstate and Duplan multiplied the inflation-
inclusive earnings forecasts of the debtor firms by a risk-adjusted
P/E ratio,123 they derived estimates of value that were future and
nominal rather than present and real. The courts, apparently, mis-
understood the mechanics of the market.
When investors expect real rather than inflationary earnings
growth from a firm, the company's stock price will rise, as will its
P/E ratio. The reciprocal of the ratio, however, is not the discount
rate that the market used to capitalize the higher real earnings ex-
pectancy. The higher P/E ratio simply reflects that the actual dis-
count rate for the future earnings has been offset by an expecta-
tion of real growth, and thus reduced.2 4 Inflationary expectations
prompt investors to project growth in a firm's earnings even when
no real growth is expected. In such situations, however, stock
prices and P/E ratios will not necessarily increase. 12  As the risk-
free rate rises because of inflationary expectations, investors also
increase the rate by which their expectation of the inflated future
income is discounted.12 6 All market prices, and hence all P/E ra-
tios, include these adjustments investors make for their expecta-
tions of price level changes.1 27 Again, the P/E ratio will not yield
the discount rate actually used to capitalize future earnings. The
ratios will be unchanged only because the market has offset the
121. See J. FRANcIs, supra note 75, at 264.
122. See W. SHARPE, supra note 14, at 308-09. Describing one method of valuation
employed by analysts, Sharpe writes, "First, a stock's future earnings per share... a year
or so hence will be estimated; then the analyst. . . will estimate a 'normal' price-earnings
ratio ... for the stock. The product of these two numbers gives the estimated future price."
Id. at 308 (emphasis in original). The "normal price earnings ratio" occurs when a stock
sells at the price at which the analyst believes it should sell, that is, when its market price
equals its intrinsic worth. Id. at 309. The purpose of the court's examination of average
ratios of the debtor's competitors is to determine the normal ratio for the reorganized firm.
123. See notes 82-106 supra and accompanying text.
124. See J. FRAcis, supra note 75, at 264-67.
125. See J. LORm & M. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 20; W. SHAmS, supra note 14, at
310.
126. See notes 66-73 supra and accompanying text.
127. See W. SHARPE, supra note 14, at 168. "If investors are concerned with real re-
turns, all securities will be priced so that expected monetary returns incorporate expected
inflation." Id.
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effect of an increased discount rate by projecting correspondingly
increased nominal earnings.
The process by which the market adjusts for future increased
inflation is the same as the process that simultaneously creates
higher interest rates-a principle that the Second Circuit clearly
understood in Doca.'28 The court in that case discounted the wage
earner's real income expectancy at a 2% rate because it expected
that rate to be the nominal future interest rate less its inflationary
component. The 2% rate, therefore, was found to be the real time
value of money. 129 The Duplan court did not err by citing Doca as
authority that inflation should be considered."'0 The court, how-
ever, failed to realize that if the reciprocal of the industry P/E ra-
tio is used as a discount rate for the predicted earnings of a firm,
that rate should be treated as was the 2% Doca rate-as one from
which the expected inflation premium has already been subtracted.
To capitalize an inflation-adjusted earnings forecast by a multi-
plier derived from industry ratios would be comparable to using
the 2% Doca rate in discounting after the wage earner's expec-
tancy had already been increased to reflect nominal gains through
inflation. The Second Circuit understood this and properly refused
to allow any further consideration of inflationary gains in the wage
earner's income expectancy.13 1 The formula for calculating reor-
ganization value employed in both Interstate and Duplan, how-
ever, gave redundant consideration to purely nominal projected
growth, and thereby tended to overstate the present values.
V. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS
In Interstate and Duplan the courts overlooked the basic pur-
pose of enterprise valuation-to determine the present worth of
the debtor firm's earnings expectancy.13 2 The method used by both
courts to ascertain reorganization value did not yield the present
worth of the debtors' operations and may have resulted in overval-
uation at the expense of senior claimants. Part of the courts' mis-
take was their use of inflation-inclusive earnings forecasts in the
valuation formula. Nevertheless, this Recent Development does
128. Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense S. A., 634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 2049 (1981).
129. Id. at 39.
130. In re Duplan Corp., 9 B.R. 921, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing Doca v. Marina Mer-
cante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980)).
131. 634 F.2d at 40.
132. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941).
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not suggest that courts should rely solely on current market prices
of the debtor's stock in assessing enterprise worth, or that courts
have been misguided in characterizing reorganization value as an
estimate of long run investment value rather than short run mar-
ket price. Courts, however, must be careful not to confuse long-
term investment value with future value in determining enterprise
worth. The investment value of any security is the present worth
that an investor, having discounted his projections of the com-
pany's future income, believes the asset ought to have. The inves-
tor then compares his subjective determination of present value
with the market price and bases his purchase or sale decision on
the results of the comparison. Implicit in that decisional process is
the notion, judicially recognized in Institutional Investors, Equity
Funding, and Imperial '400', that long run investment (or intrin-
sic) value does not always coincide with short run market consen-
sus.133 Nevertheless, both are estimates of a present rather than
future value.
Market investors, not having at their disposal all of the infor-
mation available to a court, may not form the same conclusions
about value as the court. Still, a court, in appraising reorganization
value, should go through the same process as an informed inves-
tor134 seeking to identify securities whose investment values have
not yet been reflected in the market place. Moreover, if a court is
to derive the "best estimate of value" which informed market in-
vestors would assign to a company comparable to the debtor,13 5 the
court should use all available information as an investor would use
it. A reorganization court should determine the discount rate for
future earnings expectancies as the typical investor would, by first
determining the risk-free rate of return and then adding an appro-
priate risk premium.3 6 Current risk-free rates are ascertainable by
reference to the return on government securities. Enterprise risk
can be measured by reference to published statistics that show the
133. J. LORm & M. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 271; W. SHARPz, supra note 14, at 345.
See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text.
134. See In re Equity Funding Corp. of America, 391 F. Supp. 768, 773 (C.D. Cal.
1975) (Reorganization value is the value that would exist in a perfect market adequately
stocked with willing and informed investors).
135. In re Equity Funding Corp. of America, 416 F. Supp. 132, 145 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
136. While courts recognize that a proper discount rate should reflect the risk associ-
ated with the debtor's business, the risk-free component is rarely accounted for explicitly.
See In re Muskegon Motor Specialties, 366 F.2d 522, 527 (6th Cir. 1966); In re Imperial
'400' Nat'l Inc., 374 F. Supp. 949, 974 (D.N.J. 1974); In re Keeshin Freight Lines, Inc., 86 F.
Supp. 439, 445 (N.D. Il1. 1949).
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historical relationship between average market returns and returns
on the securities of specific firms that are comparable to the
debtor.13 7 Alternatively, a court might employ the King Re-
sources ' approach, and add to the current prime interest rate an
equity investment premium of 2 % plus an additional premium for
the risk associated with the debtor's business. 139 Either procedure
could be conveniently used, particularly if the court has access to
expert testimony concerning the relevant components of a current
discount rate. Both procedures are especially suitable for debtor
firms involved in high growth industries, in which the earnings-
price ratios of its competitors are least likely to reflect the actual
discount rates used by investors to capitalize future earnings.140
Furthermore, explicit inclusion of the risk-free rate would enable
courts to make accurate adjustments for inflation, either by in-
creasing projected earnings or by reducing the discount rate by its
inflation premium.
If a court insists on using an industry P/E ratio as a multi-
plier, it must make a number of corrections. The court must ex-
tract any inflationary component from the earnings forecast before
it applies the multiplier in order to obtain an estimate of real-as
opposed to nominal-future value. If real future earnings exceed
current earnings, the court must discount the real future value to
present worth. To appropriately discount real future earnings, the
court might start, as in Doca, with the real time value of money
(2 % per annum) and add, as in King Resources, an additional 2 %
for an equity investment premium, to reach a discount rate of 4%.
If the risk premium has already been accommodated in the choice
of a multiplier, as in Interstate and Duplan, the 4% rate would be
137. These statistics that are measures of enterprise risk are beta coefficients. If an
investor owned all existing stocks, his average return would be higher than the rate on risk-
less assets. The difference between the average market return and the riskless rate is termed
the market risk premium. If the risk of a particular security is equal to the average market
risk, the stock's beta coefficient will be 1. If the stock is twice as risky as the average market
stock, its coefficient will be 2. Hence, the risk premium of any stock may be measured as
follows:
Risk = b(Km-Rf)
Here, b is the beta coefficient, K m is the average market return, and Rf is the riskless rate of
interest. The required rate of return for a particular stock is thus Rf + b(Km-Rf). See E.
BRIGHAM, supra note 12, at 110-21; W. SHARPE, supra note 14, at 2A4-78.
138. 651 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1980).
139. Id. at 1336 n.7. The district court did not account for the risk-free rate explicitly
but did include the prime rate in the calculation of an appropriate discount factor. The
prime rate incorporates the risk-free rate.
140. Blum, supra note 120, at 99-100.
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an appropriate rate by which to reduce the real earnings expec-
tancy to current value. Otherwise, the court must also add a risk
premium. The use of either suggested method would avoid the er-
rors of the Interstate and Duplan courts, and would result in an
estimate of reorganization value more reflective of actual present
corporate worth.
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